

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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P R 201509Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5608

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 32491

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, FR

SUBJ: EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DESPITE A SENSE OF CONCERN IN PARIS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, WE BELIEVE THERE IS AN EXAGGERATED PERCEPTION IN SOME NATO CAPITALS OF GOF WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE ITS COOPERATION IN EUROPE'S DEFENSE. THE GOF IS POSING THE ISSUE THE FRENCH DESCRIBE AS "THE INCREASINGLY DISTINCT CHARACTER OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE." THEY ARE FOCUSING EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE PROSPECTIVE ROLES OF NATO, EUROGROUP, WEU, THE EC AND BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT PROVIDING SECRET

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ANSWERS TO THE ISSUE THEY POSE. THEY ARE NOT, HOWEVER, MOVING TOWARD NATO AS THE FOCUS OF THEIR ATTENTION. THE U.S. SHOULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF HOW IT WILL RESPOND TO THE QUESTION POSED BY THE FRENCH, PARTICULARLY SINCE EUROPEANS'

POSITION IS NOT RIGID AND WE CAN INFLUENCE DIRECTION OF THEIR THINKING. OUR DECISION WILL HAVE FUNDAMENTAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF NATO. END SUMMARY.

2. FRANCE'S APPROACH TO NATIONAL DEFENSE RESTS ON SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS: FIRST, THE SOVIETS POSE A REAL THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE. SECOND, TO BE EFFECTIVE, DEFENSE MUST BE NATIONAL AND INDEPENDENT. ONLY THE NATION STATE CAN GALVANIZE THE LOYALTIES AND EFFORTS NEEDED TO BUILD A STRONG DEFENSE. THIRD, THE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE IS THE BASIC INGREDIENT OF SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE, WHICH IS THE GOAL OF FRANCE'S DEFENSE EFFORT. FOURTH, A PROLONGED CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT IN EUROPE MUST BE AVOIDED. TO THE GOF, THE DEVASTATION THAT WOULD FLOW FROM A RE-RUN OF WORLD WAR II COMBAT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM THE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR WAR. FIFTH, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THEIR LINKAGE TO EUROPE BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF U.S. FORCES ON THE CONTINENT, ARE NECESSARY TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE. SIXTH, THE UNITED STATES IS AN INCREASINGLY UNRELIABLE PARTICIPANT IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF NUCLEAR PARITY AND US-USSR BILATERALISM, PARTLY BECAUSE OF NEO-ISOLATIONISM IN THE U.S. SEVENTH, WHILE GERMANY POSES NO PRESENT THREAT AGAINST FRANCE, POSSIBLE SHIFTS IN GERMANY'S POLICIES COULD CHANGE THIS. EIGHTH, FRENCH DEFENSE IS STRENGTHENED TO THE EXTENT THAT OTHER NATIONS DEPLOY LARGE MODER FORCES BETWEEN FRANCE'S EASTERN BORDER AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. NINTH, AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND DEFENSE POLICIES, INDEPENDENT OF U.S. CONTROL (BUT ASSOCIATED WITH THE U.S. WHERE THAT APPEARS ADVANTAGEOUS TO EUROPE) ARE A GOAL OF EUROPEAN UNION. TENTH, FRANCE'S POLITICAL AIM OF USING THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MOVEMENT AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING ITS OWN POWER, REGIONALLY AND GLOBALLY, IS REINFORCED BY FRANCE'S ASPIRATIONS TO PLAY A COMMANDING ROLE EVENTUALLY IN BUILDING A UNIQUELY EUROPEAN DEFENSE. FINALLY, FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY MUST OBTAIN EXPORT MARKETS ADEQUATE TO INCREASE PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN THIS SECTOR, KEY FRENCH VIEWS OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

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3. FROM THESE ASSUMPTIONS AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF DANGEROUS TRANSITIONS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, FRG OSTPOLITIK AND WANING EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORTS -- ALL TIED TO WHAT THE FRENCH SEE AS AN UNDULY BENIGN VIEW OF DETENTE BY THE U.S. AND MOST OF EUROPE -- THE FRENCH FEAR THAT THE OLD DAYS OF THE US/NATO GUARANTEE OF FRENCH SECURITY ARE NUMBERED. WHILE WE DETECT NO SENSE OF IMMEDIACY IN FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT HOW TO REPLACE THIS DIMINISHING GUARANTEE, THE FRENCH ARE POSING THE QUESTION -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES OBSCURELY -- ABOUT EUROPE'S FUTURE SECURITY.

4. FRENCH PRONOUNCEMENTS ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE HAVE BEEN A STRANGE MIXTURE OF GENERAL STATEMENTS THAT EUROPE'S DEFENSE IS

SSUMING A SPECIAL CHARACTER (E.G., FONMIN JOBERT'S STATEMENTS OVER PAST SIX MONTHS, FRENCH DRAFT NATO DECLARATION), COUPLED WITH ALMOST TOTAL SILENCE REGARDING WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD FLOW FROM THIS GENERAL PRINCIPLE. WHEN WE SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM SENIOR GOF OFFICIALS REGARDING EVOLVING FRENCH THINKING ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE, WE ARE TOLD THAT FRENCH EFFORTS ARE DESIGNED TO PRODUCE MORE CONSERVATIVE EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO THINK ABOUT THEIR OWN DEFENSE. OUR SOURCES ALWAYS UNDERLINE, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE REMAINS COMMITTED TO ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, THAT U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AND PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE ARE CRUCIAL TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE AND THAT AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORT IS A LONG WAY IN THE FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, BY THEIR ACTIONS THE FRENCH SEEM DETERMINED TO FORCE THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO CONFRONT QUESTION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

5. TO A EUROPEE HUNGRY FOR SOME SIGN THAT FRANCE IS PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER D  
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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W  
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P R 201509Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5609  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
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AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
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EXDIS

6. AT THE SAME TIME THAT FRENCH ARE PUBLICIZING DISTINCT NATURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE, OUR OTHER ALLIES PERCEIVE IN U.S. ACTIONS OVER LAST MONTHS THE SUGGESTION THAT FRENCH VIEW IS NOT COMPLETELY WRONG. THIS HAS LED SOME OF THEM TO COVER THEIR

NATO BETS BY SHOWING SOME RECEPTIVITY TO GOF EFFORTS, EITHER IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT FRENCH REALLY MEAN, OR TO ENCOURAGE FRENCH IN WHAT ALLIES BELIEVE TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION. THUS, THOUGH LEBER AND SCHEEL PUBLICLY REJECT A FRENCH HINT THAT "DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION" ON EUROPE'S DEFENSE MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN THE WEU, BRANDT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE, SIGNALING TO POMPIDOU IN THE COURSE OF FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT (PARIS 30955) THAT GERMANY DID NOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT IDEA OF SECRET

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WEU AS FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE DISCUSSION. SIMILARLY, ITALIANS SEEM PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN IDEA OF WEU AS FORUM TO ENTICE FRENCH INTO MEANINGFUL DEFENSE DISCUSSION (ROME 13429 (NOTAL). AS OUR ANALYSIS IN PARIS 32185 SUGGESTED, WE AGREE WITH EMBOFF COMMENT IN PARA 2 OF ROME 13429 AND WITH FRG VIEW (BONN 17324 NOTAL) THAT GOF IS UNDER PRESSURE TO RETHINK EUROGROUP ISSUE. IT IS PULLED BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH FAVOR GOF ASSOCIATION WITH EUROGROUP, AND TRADITIONAL GAULLIST REJECTION OF MOST LINKS TO NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY SYSTEM. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE FRG, UK AND OTHERS ARE FIRM IN REJECTING THE WEU AS MECHANISM TO INCLUDE FRANCE IN EUROPEAN-WIDE MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES, FRANCE WILL BE FORCED INCREASINGLY TO MEASURE THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CONTINUED ABSTENTION FROM EUROGROUP. THE RESOLUTION OF THIS EUROGROUP/WEU ISSUE COULD HAVE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR FOCAL POINT OF POTENTIALLY EMERGING EUROPEAN DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON EUROGROUP IN ARA OF MILITARY ARMS COOPERATION CERTAINLY WOULD BE KEY TO ANY EFFORT TO BRING FRANCE CLOSER TO NATO DEFENSE. THUS, WE BELIEVE US SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE EUROGROUP AND, IF POSSIBLE, INFLUENCE THEM TOWARD AN EARLY EFFORT THAT WILL HAVE POSITIVE ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO MEMBERS OF EUROGROUP.

7. WE CANNOT PREDICT WITH ASSURANCE WHETHER FRANCE WILL BE PREPARED IN FUTURE TO TURN ITS BACK ON DECADE OF INDEPENDENT DEFENSE. NOR CAN WE BE CERTAIN THAT A DECISION TAKEN BY THE GOF TO MOVE TOWARD GENUINE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, EVEN AT RISK OF SURRENDERING SOME OF ITS NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, WOULD BE PERPETUATED BY SUCCEEDING GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT FRANCE WISHES TO HAVE BOTH INDEPENDENT CONTROL OVER ITS DEFENSE DESTINY, AND ADDED STRENGTH THAT MIGHT BE OBTAINED FROM DEFENSE "COOPERATION" THAT DOES NOT RISK INFRINGING ON FRENCH INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION. DILEMMA FOR GOF IS NO DIFFERENT NOW THAN IN 1966. GOF DEFENSE INDEPENDENCE AND GENUINE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION ARE FUNDAMENTALLY IRRECONCILABLE IN TERMS OF CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP THAT IS ANY LARGER THAN SUM OF ITS NATIONAL PARTS. SEEN FROM HERE, GOF VIEW OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE (WHETHER SECRET

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INDEPENDENT OR "COORDINATED" CONTRASTS DRAMATICALLY WITH THE EUROPEAN (AND NORTH AMERICAN) DEFENSE SYSTEM RESTING ON NATO PARTNERSHIP -- A SECURITY SYSTEM THAT IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS INTEGRATED.

8. BEYOND FRANCE'S GENUINE CONCERNS ABOUT FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, WE SUSPECT THAT THE GOF PERCEIVES AN OPPORTUNITY TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SECURITY ISSUE AS A MEANS TO FURTHER ITS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS IN EUROPE, I.E., TO MOVE ITS ALLIES TOWARD AN INCREASINGLY UNITED EUROPE, UNDER FRENCH LEADERSHIP, THAT CAN SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR ENDOWING FRENCH POLITICAL MOVES WITH MORE WEIGHT THAN THEY WOULD HAVE BASED ON THE GOF ALONE. THUS, WHAT SEEMS ON THE SURFACE TO BE A FRENCH MANEUVER DESIGNED TO ADDRESS AS SECURITY PROBLEM, MAY ALSO SERVE POLITICAL PURPOSES OF FRENCH EUROPEAN POLICY.

9. IN LIGHT OF APPARENT FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NATURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE, ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS THAT MIGHT BE USED TO ENGAGE FRENCH ON THIS SUBJECT (BILATERAL, NATO, WEU, EUROGROUP, AND EC POLITICAL STRUCTURE) OFFER PLUSES AND MINUSES IN TERMS OF U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE.

10. IF WE STILL SEE NATO AS THE PRINCIPAL MECHANISM FOR ATLANTIC DEFENSE, THEN BILATERAL, NATO AND EUROGROUP RELATIONS MAY BE BEST WAY TO ENGAGE FRENCH. IT WILL DEMAND CONTINUED PATIENCE WITH FRENCH HESITATIONS AND A UNITED NATO FRONT TO DISABUSE FRENCH OF HOPE THAT THEY CAN DEFINE EUROPE'S DEFENSE IN NON-NATO TERMS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SEEK TO CREATE GENUINE EUROPEAN DEFENSE PERSONALITY -- AND IF WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT LIKELY DIMINUTION OF NATO AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THAT DEFENSE WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY A EUROPEAN DEFENSE WITH ITS DISTINCT CHARACTER -- WE MAY WANT TO FAVOR (OR AT LEAST NOT OPPOSE) FRENCH EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD WEU, AND TOWARD SOME DEFENSE DIMENSION FOR GROWING EC POLITICAL COORDINATION.

11. ANY CONSIDERATION OF INSTITUTIONAL FORUMS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE WILL ALSO HAVE TO CONSIDER SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS SUCH AS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND TECHNOLOGY, AND HOPES AND FEARS OF UK, FRANCE, FRG AND OTHERS CONCERNING CONTINUED VIABILITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR GUARANTEE AND POSSIBLE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE.

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12. THESE ISSUES POSE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS THAT GO TO HEART OF OUR VIEW OF EUROPE'S (AND AMERICA'S) SECURITY IN COMING YEARS. NEVERTHELESS, IN OUR OPINION, GIVEN FRENCH INITIATIVES IN POPULARIZING THESE ISSUES, WE MUST DECIDE WHERE WE WANT TO SEE EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORT MOVE.

13. WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON UNDERTAKE A COMPLETE REVIEW OF QUESTIONS POSED BY THE FRENCH: IS EUROPEAN DEFENSE ASSUMING A CHARACTER INCREASINGLY DISTINCT FROM U.S. DEFENSE? IF SO, WHAT SHOULD BE THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THIS CHANGE? SHOULD NATO REMAIN FOCAL POINT FOR OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, LEAVING IT TO FRENCH TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO COME TO TERMS WITH NATO DEFENSE? SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE EUROPEANS TO BUILD A EUROPEAN DEFENSE WITHIN NATO (E.G., THE EUROGROUP)? SHOULD WE ACCEPT FRENCH EFFORTS TO DISCUSS, AND PERHAPS DEVELOP, A EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRUCTURE OUTSIDE OF NATO? WE DO NOT HAVE NEW ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS. IN OUR VIEW, NATO NOW AND IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE CONTINUES TO OFFER THE BEST VEHICLE FOR A SUCCESSFUL US-EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORT. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT FRENCH WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION AND REVIEW OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE. WE NEED TO DECIDE OUR ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS, AND TO TRANSFORM THESE ANSWERS INTO A CONSCIOUS POLICY.

14. WHILE FRENCH REMAIN UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PRECISE DIRECTION IN WHICH THEY WANT EUROPE'S DEFENSE TO MOVE AND THUS ARE NOT PRESSING THEIR ALLIES FOR IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT, AN EARLY U.S. DECISION ON WHERE WE WANT EUROPE'S DEFENSE EFFORT TO MOVE WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE A PURPOSEFUL INPUT TO EUROPEAN THINKING BEFORE POSITIONS BECOME RIGID.

GDS  
IRWIN

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ATHENS  
BONN  
BRUSSELS  
COPENHAGEN  
LISBON  
LONDON

LUXEMBOURG  
OSLO  
OTTAWA  
REYKJAVIK  
ROME  
THE HAGUE  
NATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
EC BRUSSELS

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